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Abstract
Organizations are increasingly inter-connected as they 
source talent, goods and services from other organizations 
located in disparate parts of the world. They seek new 
ways of creating value for themselves, customers and 
partners. They operate outside and across traditional 
industry boundaries and definitions. These innovations 
have lead to a focus on business models as a fundamental 
statement of direction and identity. This paper highlights 
what is known about the business model concept and 
where and why it differs from more established concepts of 
business strategy. It illustrates how the application of 
business models has transformed organizations. The 
contribution of this paper is the guidance that it provides 
for business model design and the insight it provides into 
business models and their effects on organizations. 
Following an analysis of how business models can 
transform organizations, this paper concludes with 
practical recommendations for business model design. 
. 
1. Introduction
The term “business model” is a recent addition to the
management literature and largely a product of the dot 
com era. It is entirely absent from all the most influential 
books on organizational design, business strategy, business 
economics and business theory through to the mid- to late 
1990s. It is almost everywhere in books on e-commerce, 
both scholarly and business trade press. It is a marketing 
catchphrase for IT vendors. This paper reviews business 
model thought and practice in terms of its contribution to 
general organizational theory and practice beyond just the 
e-commerce sphere. The first questions to ask are not
“what is a business model?” but why has the term so
suddenly appeared? If business thought and practice
evolved for a century without it, is business model now a
necessary construct or just a short-lived label? What does
it add to our thinking to use it instead of, say, “strategy”,
“competitive positioning”, “organizational design”, “value
chain”, or other more well-established terms?
We examine business models from this perspective of 
necessary construct versus superfluous neologism. This 
requires filtering out the signals from a great deal of noise. 
As Hawkins states: “as the [dot com] bubble grew, the 
market filled up with books and articles about business 
models, ranging from the vaguely analytic to the quasi 
instructional – how to construct viable business models 
and how to avoid lemons. The business model seemed to 
fill a niche even if no one could explain exactly what it 
was.” (Hawkins 2004, page 65). Even today, most work on 
business models is taxonomic and descriptive, classifying 
types of business model in lists, heavily derived from 
multiple case examples. Typical is Afuah and Tucci’s 
eight categories: brokerage, advertising, intermediary, 
merchant, manufacturing, affiliate, community, 
subscription, and utility (Afuah and Tucci, 2000). 
Timmers’ classification is very different: e-shop, e-mail, 
information services provider, e-auction, value-chain 
services provider, virtual community, third-party 
marketplace, value-chain integrator. (Timmer, 1999) There 
is no established general classification, which means that 
there is as yet little theoretical base for business model 
research and application.  
The aim of this paper is to point towards an agenda for 
building such a base. Our main conclusions are that the 
term business model does indeed add to our descriptive 
understanding of the dynamics of organization and our 
ability to make sound normative recommendations and is a 
necessary intellectual construct. We see an emerging 
consensus in the most recent scholarly discussions that 
sharpens the concept and that also brings to the forefront 
general issues that have largely been peripheral, implicit or 
assumed without exploration in the management literature, 
particularly the nature of “value” in a customer-driven 
world and the implication of the customer-provider-partner 
dynamic for evolving the principles for designing 
organizations whose core operations rely on inter-
organizational links and partnerships.  
Following an overview of key concepts underlying 
business models, this paper highlights the basic principles 
upon which business models can be designed and provides 
an example of a business model that addresses the design 
principles. The implementation of business models and 
their design influence the way in which organizations 
transform their structures to meet the demands placed 
upon them. The contribution of the paper is in the 
framework for business model design and in the insight it 
provides into the applications of business models and their 
effects on organizations. It concludes with practical 
recommendations for business model design. 
2. Concepts Underlying Business Models
“Logic” and “value” are core words in the literature on
business models. Basically, the emerging consensus is that 
a business model is a hypothesis (i.e., a model) of how to 
generate value in a customer-driven marketplace. It is a 
highly focused “public” declaration intended to help 
identify and build relationships that are core to turning the 
model into reality. Magretta highlights the “narrative” 
element of business models: “The business model tells a 
logical story explaining who your customers are, what 
they value, and how you’ll make money providing them 
that value.” It is in this sense that we view a business 
model as a hypothesis to be tested in the marketplace and 
often subject to public scrutiny particularly by investors. 
Hawkins (2004) makes the interesting point that a business 
model may become a product in and of itself. Certainly, in 
the dot com era the business model was the selling point 
for most startups and it is very much the “brand” for such 
successful e-commerce firms as Amazon, eBay and 
Priceline. 
The most parsimonious definition of business model is 
by Rappa (2002): it “spells out how the company makes 
money.” Betz (2002) similarly states that it is “an 
abstraction of a business identifying how [it] profitably 
makes money.” “A business model is a blend of three 
streams that are critical to the business. These include the 
value stream for the business partners and the buyers, the 
revenue stream, and the logistical stream.” (Mahadevan, 
(2000). Linder and Cantrell, (2001) extend their own 
definition of a business model as “the organization’s core 
logic for creating value” to its including within it: “the set 
of value propositions an organization offers to its 
stakeholders, along with the operating processes to deliver 
on these, arranged as a coherent system, that both relies on 
and builds assets, capabilities and relationships to build 
value.” 
There are several common themes running through 
these conceptions. The most distinctive is the focus on 
“value.” The second is that they all stress that a business 
model is a statement of the basic “logic” of the business; it 
is an abstraction of propositions, articulated as claims and 
intentions. In some regards, this intellectual base for 
business models contrasts usefully with the less rigorous 
conception of business vision that preceded it; both of 
these are intended to set the framework for strategies for 
market innovation and/or organizational transformation. 
This relates to the third common theme: the separation of 
business model from business strategy and also from 
organizational structure. The business model establishes 
the principles and axioms on which strategy is built. 
Strategy follows on from the business model and is 
targeted to achieve competitive differentiation. To some 
degree, the business model is the “what” of business 
innovation and strategy the “how.” As a number of 
commentators observe, the two terms business model and 
strategy are often used interchangeably. This both weakens 
the value of the sharp logic of an effective business model 
and makes it a redundant concept if it is just a variant on 
strategy.  
The separation of business model from strategy has 
far-reaching impacts. The most consequential is that the 
logic of value-generation is the core of a business model; 
the details of how to realize that value are in the domain of 
strategy. Many of the dot com models were hypotheses of 
value-generation that may have looked accurate in the 
laboratory stage of the startup but were not supported in 
the large-scale application of the model in the marketplace. 
These are often referred to as “broken” models. Others 
were perhaps valid hypotheses but were undermined by 
inattention to execution. Many commentators argue that 
too many companies and their investors saw their business 
model almost as self-implementing. Strategy and 
execution were ignored.  
An in-depth series of research studies of e-commerce 
retailing innovations in eight countries ranging from 
Australia to Hong Kong to Greece to Denmark to the 
United States, concludes that a clearly stated and 
understood business model is a prerequisite for success, 
but ultimate success or failure rests on the capability of the 
firm to customize both model and follow-on strategy to the 
dynamics of the market (Elliot, 2002). The case studies 
show very clearly that while the specifics of the business 
models, markets, consumer factors, and regulatory and 
business environments differ widely across the world, the 
management issues are very similar. This suggests that 
there is a sharp distinction between model and strategy 
that may be characterized as innovation plus discipline. It 
is a truism that many of the dot coms focused on 
innovation at the expense of discipline – business model at 
the cost of strategy.  
Magretta provides one example of the distinction and 
its implications. After discussing Dell’s business model 
that transformed the basics of an entire industry and – a 
measure of an effective model – has turned out to be 
difficult to replicate, she adds that “What often gets lost in 
the Dell story is the role that pure strategy has played in 
the company’s superior performance. While Dell’s direct 
business model laid out which value activities it would do 
(and which it wouldn’t do), the company still had crucial 
strategic choices to make about which customers to serve 
and what kinds of products and services to offer.” 
(Magretta, 2002, page 8.) Several competitors, such as HP, 
attempted to duplicate Dell’s direct sales model and failed 
(just as Dell failed when it moved its strategy in the 
opposite direction from its business model to add in-store 
sales). Companies and commentators often speak of 
“adopting” a particular business model. The term is 
revealing in that it implies that adoption equates to 
execution.  
Many commentators, particularly in the business press, 
blur the distinction between business model and strategy. 
That leads to such 2005 headlines as “Wayport Unveils Its 
McDonald’s Hotspot Business Model.” Translated, this 
means that Wayport, a wi-fi service provider, has entered 
into a joint agreement for Waypoint and its many other wi-
fi partners to offer services in McDonald’s restaurants for 
a fixed monthly fee. This is strategy, not model. “Winter 
Schedule Moves TWA Into American’s Business Model” 
similarly means that TWA has been integrated into 
American Airlines operations, with some changes to 
TWA’s flight frequencies and aircraft types. Both airlines 
operate under basically the same business practices. 
Business model has little to do with the integration. An 
announcement by AutoByTel states that it will conduct a 
90-day test of a new GM online locate-to-order business
model. This more deserves the term “business process than
business model. “IBM Unveils Its China Business Model”
equally could be restated as IBM China’s organizational
plan, since the main thrust is to open new offices that
operate as China IBM rather than as an international
division of corporate IBM.
3. Business Model Design Principles
There are very few guidelines in the research literature
on business models as to the principles for designing a 
business model. This is not surprising if the main criteria 
are those of the U.S. Patent Office: usefulness, novelty and 
non-obviousness. Amit and Zott identify theoretical work 
on value creation that provide some inputs to business 
model thinking (Amit and Zott, 2001, page 511). These are 
value chain analysis, Schumpeterian innovation, Resource-
based theory, Strategic network theory, and Transaction 
cost economics. 
They map these against four design schemes, as shown 
below (our table is adapted from the original) that the 
researchers identify from their empirical surveys: 
efficiency, innovation, complementarities (the firm’s 
bundling of capabilities and resources and its bundling of 
products and services) and customer lock-in. The table 
entries describe the degree to which the different 
theoretical frameworks view each of the design schemes as 
important for value creation. Schumpeter’s “creative 
destruction”, for instance, views innovation as a high value 
generator. Transaction cost economics, which has been the 
underlying intellectual underpinning of many brokerage, 
value-adding intermediary and business-to-business 
initiatives, regards innovation as of low importance. 
Table 1: Principles of Business Model Design 
Novelty  Efficiency  Comple-
mentarities  
Lock-in 
Schumpeter
ian analysis 
High   Low   Low  Low 
Value chain 
Analysis 
Medium Medium  Medium Low 
Strategic 
network 
theory 
Medium  Medium Medium  High  
Resource-
based  
theory 
Medium Low High Medium
Transaction 
cost 
economics 
Low High Low   Medium 
The above analysis points to Efficiency and Innovation as 
the two main distinguishing features of successful business 
models. This table suggests that designers will not gain 
much practical guidance from strategic theory. The focus 
on Efficiency leads to transaction cost economics as a rich 
source of guidelines, but at the expense of Innovation. 
Schumpeterian innovation points to exactly the opposite 
path for design. It is a testable proposition that any 
business model that can successfully combine the four 
design themes will not fit into existing theory. In this 
sense, an agenda for study is the role of truly innovative 
business models in theory-making.  
4. Transforming Organizational Structures: a
missing theme 
One topic that seems ignored in research on business 
models is the link between model and organizational form. 
The main question for research here is does a unique 
business model require a unique organizational design? 
From the information available on such firms as Amazon, 
eBay, Dell, PriceLine, Autobytel and other business 
model-driven companies, there is no evidence of any 
organizational design that differs from the main trends in 
large businesses. Their annual financial reports show 
traditional job titles for their senior executives and 
traditional organizational functions such as Marketing, 
Finance, and Human Resources. A priori, we might expect 
that a firm with a business model based on Schumpeterian 
innovation would place a high premium on flexibility (See 
Fulk and deSanctis (1995) for a comprehensive survey and 
synthesis of organizational forms designed to ensure 
flexibility and adaptability.) In addition, we might expect a 
marked shift towards “customer-centric” designs 
(Galbraith, 2002) with an emphasis on account 
management and customer relationship managers; that 
emphasis reflects the primacy of customer power, a power 
that business models aim at co-opting. 
Case studies and taxonomies are a form of learning. 
Most research to date on business models has focused on 
what we can learn from the experiences of both winners 
and losers in the e-commerce sphere. Most of the learning 
to date has been about the links from model to strategy. 
Here, for example, eBay has provided many instructional 
lessons. Its CEO has spoken often of how she joined the 
company because she was attracted by its distinctive 
business model but found a situation where strategy was 
badly lacking. That lack was publicly revealed in the 
widely-reported crash of its entire Web site for 22 hours. 
The CEO has built many new strategic capabilities that 
support the business model. Can an eBay provide equal 
instruction about organizational form and functioning? 
The following sections address this question by providing 
an overview of applications of business models to 
organizations and the changes to our thinking about 
organizations that have ensued as a result of these business 
models. Following an overview of contemporary 
perspectives on business models, the paper concludes with 
implications and research and practice. 
5. Applications to Organizations
A business model is not a strategy. The separation of
model from strategy is both the strength and weakness of 
the business model concept. Its strength is its focus on 
what may be termed the logic of value. This is a useful 
addition to management thought and practice, even where 
the hypothesis of value-generation failed to be validated in 
the marketplace. See Keen (2004) for a discussion of the 
early Web-based commerce as an innovation laboratory, to 
be looked at in terms of lessons it provides rather than 
ratings of successes and failures. We suggest for future 
researchers that a fruitful extension of taxonomies of 
business models is to map them into taxonomies of value-
generation. For example, many of the most original 
business models fall into a widely used category of “e-
auctions.” Some of these proposed the application of 
reverse auctions (FreeMarket), dutch auctions (an eBay 
feature), blind auctions, Japanese auctions, reverse 
auctions, Vikrey auctions and many other exotic variants.  
These “experiments” (in the sense that many of them 
failed) have generated a rich body of empirical studies and 
theoretical research. (See for example a detailed study of 
blind auctions and transaction cost efficiencies in financial 
trading (Kavajecz and Keim, 2003) and the impact of 
reverse auctions on U.S. Federal Government agencies’ 
procurement. (McCaney, 2005) (Reverse auctions are ones 
with many sellers and a single buyer, which contrasts with 
the more typical situation of many buyers, single seller). 
The latter article claims that private-sector reverse auctions 
saved FreeMarket’s clients $2.7 billion in 2004, an 
average of 15 percent and that the U.S. Navy saved 29 
percent for one contract. 
Add to these examples Priceline’s unique quasi-
bidding model for travel services, one of the most original 
early dot com business models and one that has been a 
growing success1 and we have a rich base for assessing the 
dynamics of value in the customer-provider-partner 
relationship that underlies so many e-commerce and 
supply chain management value networks. The most 
distinctive feature of the newer business models has been 
their assumption that these must be symmetric; all parties 
must gain some new value through the relationship. This is 
why we described business models in general as 
hypothesis of value-generation in a customer-driven 
world. (Our emphasis added) Organizational literature is 
largely based on a business-driven world: the assumption 
has been that companies are defined by their production 
function, and must organize to optimize their costs and 
operations so that they can gain a differentiation in the 
marketplace and attract consumers. The customer is a 
recent invention.  
It may seem unconventional to speak of the customer 
as an invention but in the world of regulation and 
oligopolies most industries did not have customers, only 
subscribers and consumers. Keen (2004) defines a 
customer: 
1. Customers have choices
2. They have the information to evaluate options and
locate deals
3. They have the confidence to make those choices
4. No one can block them from exercising their rights to
make their choice
5. No one can prevent new entrants offering new
choices.
When all of these factors apply, as they do in e-
commerce and such sectors as mobile phones, travel 
bookings and financial services, companies must think 
carefully how to balance value to the customer with value 
to themselves. Business models are a vehicle for 
addressing this balance. Up through the 1980s and in many 
instances through to the new century, industry boundaries 
were tightly defined, either through regulation (banking, 
telecommunications), industry structure, advantages of 
scale, and barriers to new entrants (automotive, 
pharmaceuticals), so that “consumers” largely had 
constrained choices, and the main challenges to the 
organization were its own internal structures, processes 
and administrative coordination. The structure of an 
industry often meant that information was available to 
intermediaries, such as car dealers and travel agents, but 
not to customers. In the early days of such deregulation as 
long distance phone service, customers had choices but 
lacked the confidence to make them and thus stayed for a 
time with the previous monopoly provider. 
1 Priceline reported $50 million in profits for fiscal 2004, a 
57 percent increase over 2003. 
“Value” in this business- rather than customer-driven 
context means value to the company as the goal, with that 
value depending on consumer satisfaction. Cost, market 
share and price were the main variables of value 
management. Relationships with suppliers were very much 
based on bargaining and contracts, with power customers 
playing off suppliers and vice versa. (See Dyer (1996) for 
a discussion of this power game in action in the 
automotive industry and the start of a move in Chrysler to 
move to a win-win rather than win-lose relationship.)  
The primacy of this perspective in which the customer 
plays a relatively passive role as a buyer and suppliers are 
just suppliers is apparent in Michael Porter’s influential 
value chain framework. (See Porter (1994) for his own 
synthesis of the evolution of his thinking on competitive 
strategy, which aimed at fusing what he describes as the 
two main and contrasting views of strategy, one that 
emphasizes organizational differentiation via what is now 
termed core competencies and one where “competitive 
advantage was defined by a single variable: cost.”) 
Porter’s own conclusion is that strategy “must begin by 
declaring a clear goal for the enterprise: in my view, this 
should be superior, long-term return on investment.” 
(Porter, 2004, page 251). Out of this perception came his 
five forces of industry model, followed by the value chain. 
One of Porter’s most central tenets hints at one reason for 
the emergence of business model conceptualization: “the 
fundamental unit of analysis for developing strategy is the 
industry.” (Porter (1994, page 290).  
Put together the industry and the goal of ROI and there 
is no analytic or normative need for the business model 
view. The industry as given is in effect the business model. 
Moreover, there is a relatively fixed amount of value to be 
shared out among competitors. For example, the number 
of cars to be purchased in a country establishes the value 
boundaries for auto makers, dealers and parts suppliers. 
Each of them will use strategy to optimize their operations 
and create some differentiation that increases their share of 
the value pool.  
The need for an additive, complementary and even 
conflicting view of value generation emerges if the 
industry is not taken as a given. In the case of e-
commerce, many of the most successful innovations do 
not fit into traditional industry categories. eBay and 
Google are examples. In addition, much of the reason for 
many companies to explicitly define a business model is to 
create an innovation that either disrupts an existing 
industry (Priceline is an obvious example) or creates a new 
niche that does not directly fit into the existing industry 
structure. AutoByTel is a typical example here; it is both a 
car dealer, wholesaler, broker and information service. Its 
business model is to create new (1) customer value by 
providing information and also accessing the best deals for 
them, (2) partner value through bringing opportunities to 
dealers, lenders and other service providers, and (3) 
company value by building transaction fees. The logic of 
the AutoByTel business model is to create a new value 
pool, exploiting the automakers’ and dealers’ strategies: 
new models, pricing, advertising and distribution. 
Netflix is a company that, like eBay, opened up a new 
value space and created a niche through its simple but 
ingenious business model of subscribers renting videos via 
the Net in a way that reversed the store front strategy of 
such companies as Blockbuster; the company comes to the 
customer instead of the customer having to pick up and 
return items to the store. Netflix now faces competition 
from Amazon, for whom Netflix’s strategy for delivery, 
pricing and operations can be quickly incorporated into its 
own online customer interface and processing platform, 
and until recently from Wal-Mart, which implemented a 
low price service that it abandoned because it was unable 
to build the scale it needed; it handed over its subscriber 
list to Netflix, presumably to ward off Amazon. Given 
Wal-Mart’s immense capability base and track record, 
Netflix’s success reflects a business model rather than 
business strategy edge. 
What is the industry that combines Blockbuster, 
NetFlix, Wal-Mart and Amazon? It does not seem useful 
to use the term “industry” here. Kim and Mauborgne 
(1999) point out that a business model can create an 
entirely new market space through mobilizing customers 
for a new type of product or service. “Mobilizing” means 
attracting and keeping customers and partners, which 
depends on the value the business model offers to 
customers compared with alternate choices. 
The experiences of e-commerce seem to point to a 
conclusion: A company within an industry needs a 
strategy; a company aiming at becoming a new entrant, 
bridge industries, or create a new market space needs a 
business model first. A company within an industry that 
sees a major need or opportunity to transform itself will 
need to articulate those changes through a business model. 
That model in all these instances must provide a 
convincing logic of value-creation. 
6. The Role of a Business Model
Business models are generally a feature of startups, for
the simple reason that they need a convincing logic and 
narrative. There is no real evidence of established 
companies announcing a new business model. They 
publish instead announcements of strategic shifts. Some 
writers on the topic do look retroactively at such 
companies as Wal-Mart, Microsoft and Southwest and 
review their business models. But this does not seem a 
useful or instructive exercise, since as Porter so strongly 
argues, it is strategy that drives these firms. Only if their 
leaders were to decide to radically change the direction of 
the company would they need a new business model. Only 
then would outsiders be interested in hearing about it. For 
instance, reviewing Wal-Mart’s business model in use 
today does not throw much light on either Wal-Mart or 
what a new company might do. Perhaps a way of bridging 
the gap between business model and strategy is to 
recognize that an effective business model must first be 
supported by effective strategy and over time become 
embedded in the strategy. McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, FedEx, 
Cisco and Dell were built on their founder’s insights that 
were crystallized in what was clearly a business model 
(Michael Dell appears to be one of the earliest chief 
executives to use the term). Now the model is still the 
reference point for strategic planning but just that: a 
reminder of the founding principles – and the logic of 
value-generation.  
This suggests that, as Magretta states, there is a public 
narrative element to business models and that they serve a 
different purpose than a comparable statement of strategy 
(Magretta, 2002). The audience for these narratives is 
often the investment community, who tear apart the logic 
of the model and the detailed economic justification of its 
value-generation. In other instances, it is the base for 
building a culture and for getting everyone on the same 
page. This suggests that there may be a fruitful link in 
assessing the role of business models in terms of stories 
being the “lifeblood” of an organization. (Mitroff and 
Kilmann, 1975). Boje (1991) states that organizations are 
essentially story-telling systems. Siehl and Martin (1982) 
argue that stories are key indicators of underlying cultures 
and that socialized members of an organization are 
knowledgeable about its main stories. Stories are scripts in 
organizational settings (Martin, 1982). Quinn and 
McGrath view stories as part of the transformation of 
organizational cultures (Quinn and McGrath, 1985). 
Most of the literature on story-telling discusses stories 
that emerge within the organization. A business model 
may be thought of as a story that helps build and motivate 
an organization. In this context, it is noteworthy that many 
of the radical innovations in business are associated with 
well-known stories. Examples are Taiichi Ohno visiting 
U.S. supermarkets and realizing that here was a key to 
transforming car manufacturing through just-in-time 
inventory, Michael Dell working out of his University of 
Texas dormitory room and realizing that the world of 
personal computers must inevitably move from high-tech 
premium product to commodity, and Pierre Omidyar, the 
founder of eBay, talking with his fiancée about her 
collection of Pez dispensers and wondering if the Web 
might open up new opportunities for collectors to find 
items. 
7. Business Model Uniqueness
One of the more interesting aspects of business models
in that they can be patented in the United States. Many 
observers regard this as either a loophole in the patent 
system or a dangerous misuse of it, or both of these. 
Others argue that it is a necessary protection of intellectual 
property that encourages innovators and entrepreneurs. To 
obtain a patent, applicants must demonstrate that their 
invention is useful, novel and non-obvious over “the prior 
art.” It must also fall into one of four categories of subject 
matter: machines, articles of manufacture, compositions of 
matter, and business methods. Business models fall into 
the fourth category.  
Business method patents are relatively recent. They 
were first recognized by the U.S. federal courts in 1998. 
Since most business methods have been in use for twenty 
years or more, there are few “novel” inventions to make a 
claim for, except for Internet-based business methods. 
There has been a flood of these. Priceline patented buyer-
drive online reverse auctions, Amazon its one-click 
method, and Sightsound patented its “method for 
transmitting a desire video or audio digital signal stored on 
a first memory of a first party to a second memory of a 
second party.” It then sued music retailers who sell 
downloads and demanded royalties from mp3 music 
providers. Google, which was one of the pioneers of 
online search engines, was sued by a small company that 
had patented a “system and method for influencing a 
position on a search result list generated by a computer 
network search engine.”  
Much of this appears bizarre but the patents get 
awarded and there are as many defenders as opponents of 
the patent criteria. The more general issue it highlights is 
that business models may be a form of intellectual 
property and have an economic value if they pass the test 
of useful, novel and non-obvious. In 2003, Netflix was 
awarded a patent for its online DVD subscription service. 
The patent covers the firm’s value-generating processes. It 
provides a significant challenge to other companies 
already in or known at the time to be planning to enter the 
online market, including Wal-Mart, Blockbuster and 
Amazon. Many commentators expect that Netflix will be 
acquired, with its patent its major asset.  
Usefulness, novelty and non-obvious would seem to be 
an appropriate test of the value of a business model, 
regardless of the patent issue. Zott and Amit conclude 
from their survey of that the more efficient the design of a 
business model (appropriation of value to the company 
through four design “themes”) and the more its novelty, 
the greater the value appropriated to the “focal” firm. (Zott 
and Amit, 2002).  
8. A Framework for Design
One question that to date has had not been widely
explored in the literature on business models is when does 
an established company need to define a new model rather 
than a refinement in or redirection of strategy? This is a 
consequential executive choice. Our line of reasoning 
throughout this paper has been that a business model 
establishes first order principles and that strategy is the 
second order derivative of imperatives for action. To 
redefine an existing business model therefore is likely to 
be more disruptive and challenging than changing strategy.  
It is accordingly rare to find an explicit statement by a 
CEO of plans to change the business model of the firm, 
even when it is facing major competitive problems. One 
example of a leader who did indeed announce a change to 
the business model is Lou Gerstner’s repositioning of IBM 
at a time when it was failing badly and was seen as a 
disaster in the making. IBM’s value-generation had for 
almost a century rested on its proprietary systems and tight 
relationships with corporate customers. Gerstner 
announced that the firm would in future move to open 
systems and wider collaborative relationships, including 
with competitors, and become as much a services provider 
as a hardware/software builder. Asked what his “vision” 
for IBM was, he stated that he did not have one. (Gerstner, 
2002) A vision is not a business model. 
The business model shift that he announced certainly 
moved IBM in an entirely different direction from its 
historical strategy and has provided the first order 
principles on which he and his successor have evolved 
new strategy, including buying a large consulting firm, 
adopting the Linux open source operating system, and 
licensing its previously closely protected patents. By 
contrast, analyses of two other failing businesses that like 
IBM had dominated their ecosystems for decades, were 
household names and had been models of performance do 
not address their business model but focus on strategic 
missteps. The two are Sony and General Motors, whose 
efforts between 1995 and 2005 to stem loss of market, 
profit crunches and anemic or even negative sales growth 
had all failed. No commentator challenged their business 
models. Sony’s rests on continued product innovation and 
wide variety of products; its strategic missteps were 
summarized bluntly by the newly-appointed CEO as “the 
silos were not the slightest bit interested in coordinating 
and there was no one there to coordinate.” (Schlender, 
2005) GM’s business model is to build production volume 
to spread its fixed costs, leverage its scale and dealer 
network, and attract customers through a wide range of car 
and truck models. 
Here then is the fundamental issue for large 
organizations committed to transformation: Should the 
business model or the business strategy be the focus of 
initiative? We present below a framework that may help 
companies in answering it. It is a conceptual model of 
global sourcing of talent and capabilities, developed from 
a wide range of studies of e-commerce and international 
business. (Keen 2004, 2004a, Williams and Keen, 2005). 
We use it here to help sharpen the distinction between 
three levels of perspective on the vexed topic of 
outsourcing: operational tactics, business strategy and 
business model positioning.  
Operational tactics handle outsourcing as a make-buy, 
largely cost-based option. Commentators here draw 
heavily on transaction cost economics. The choice of in-
house operations versus outsourcing fits well in that 
theory, trading off purchase costs and coordination costs. 
The business strategy level of analysis is more radical and 
often involves contracting for a services provider to take 
over a whole function, such as back office administration 
and data centers. The strategic emphasis here is often on 
core versus non-core activities.  
The Global Capabilities Sourcing (GCS) framework 
reframes “outsourcing” as a more general business model 
issue. (The logic behind the model is presented in (Keen 
2004a). This logic suggests that coordination technology 
built around Web services is opening up new opportunities 
for organizations to access services across the globe via 
standardized product and process interfaces. (Williams and 
Keen, 2005) 
It also creates the opportunity for companies, cities and 
regions that are physically small to become “e-Big.” It is 
now routine for teams of computer programmers from 
Eastern Europe and the old USSR to make their living 
working remotely for foreign companies. Research teams 
similarly link to customers anywhere. Intellectual talent is 
now relatively location-independent. 
The pressures of deregulation and trade liberalization 
plus overcapacity are increasing commoditization and 
eroding operating margins in more and more industries. 
The demographics of developed nations are increasingly 
unfavorable for business growth: an aging population with 
high labor cost burdens. The burden is not just the direct 
cost of wages and salaries but the additional employer 
payments for payroll taxes, retirement, welfare and 
healthcare. GM, for example, pays manufacturing workers 
around $20-30 an hour but the total burden is over $60 an 
hour. Germany similarly carries heavy social payments 
added to direct wages. 
The education systems of the rest of the world have 
caught up with Europe and North America. India (the 
fourth largest country in pharmaceutical research) and 
China are graduating 2-20 times the number of students in 
technical fields as the U.S., where half of all advanced 
technical degrees are earned by foreign students who are 
increasingly either staying in their home countries or are 
discouraged or blocked from applying to U.S. universities 
because of visa delays and restrictions imposed post 9/11. 
“The China Price” has made many industries’ costs  
untenable. The China Price is a cliché coined in the mid-
2000s that equates to “whatever your own price is, less 30 
percent.” They have little choice but to find new sources 
of lower cost, high quality capability in order to remain 
competitive. 
Combine all these factors – the problem of costs and 
the China Price plus the opportunity opened up by 
coordination technology to move the work to where the 
people are instead of the other way round, the eBig supply 
of skills, a plus large global pool of well-educated labor, 
and the result is a new segmentation of global business, as 
shown in the figure below.  
  Figure 1: Global Capability Sourcing 
1. Specialist services offer premium skills at (for now
at least) a low cost burden. Engineering, research, 
architectural design, electronic records management, 
computer systems development and operations, drug 
testing, telemarketing….. The list grows. Cost is obviously 
a key factor here but it is the quality at low cost that is the 
main attraction. Many specialist services firms combine 
low labor costs with low overhead because of their 
specialization. Flextronics, for instance, is the contract 
manufacturer whose production is larger than the sales for 
most of the consumer electronics and computer hardware 
brands for whom it is the manufacturer, assembler and in 
many instances design partner. Its overhead is in the 2-3 
percent range versus the more typical 15-20 percent for its 
customers. Such firms take on much of the business risk of 
their clients, converting the fixed costs of their in-house 
manufacturing to a variable cost pay-as-you-go. One 
example here is Magna Steyr, the Austrian-Canadian firm 
to whom BMW contracted the total manufacturing of its 
X3 sports SUV, saving $1 billion in capital investment and 
five years of lead time. This is less the area of outsourcing, 
which tends to mean “out of sight, out of mind and off my 
budget” than co-sourcing: collaborative agreements to 
share tasks and responsibilities, with the company 
concentrating on its own priority tasks and using its 
premium skills. In doing so, it is in many ways insourcing 
rather than outsourcing capabilities. BMW insources 
Magna Steyr’s industry leading production engineering 
and quality control so that it can focus its own resources 
on design engineering. 
2. The assembly economy is the sad area of many
lesser developed countries. Here, low cost workers handle 
commodity tasks. Many of the widely-reported abuses of 
workers in the textile and apparel industry reflect the fact 
that this segment is price-based with no premium offer to 
add. Every month, there is a buyer looking to cut prices 
and a factory having to do so to stay in business. It is 
interesting to note how China, which has been the main 
beneficiary of the World Trade Organization’s removal of 
all tariffs on apparel goods for its members, has responded 
to the threat of new restrictions being imposed on it after 
its exports to the U.S. increased by as much as 1,000 
percent in some categories in the first three months of the 
new regime. It is moving out of the bottom end of the 
market – the $3 t-shirt and bundle of six pairs of socks for 
$2. It will leave that to the low cost assembly economy of 
such countries as Bangladesh and El Salvador. China’s 
edge is quality and education, not just cost. 
3. The outsourcing crisis creator is the sad area of
many developed countries: high labor cost burdens for 
commodity skills applied to commodity tasks. A 
commodity task may be defined as one that can be learnt 
in weeks and that is a strong candidate for automation: 
back office administration is the obvious example, along 
with routine telemarketing, machine-tending and customer 
phone service. These are jobs that are increasingly also 
candidates for contract- and price-based outsourcing to 
specialist services, wherever those may be located. It is 
distressing to many IT professionals to hear much of their 
own work described as “commodity” in nature but many 
activities are just that. They can be well-handled by 
educated foreigners who often earn one tenth the amount 
they do. Where the labor burden is high, these jobs will be 
moved and new ones not created to replace them. 
Germany, for instance, has not generated a net increase in 
manufacturing workers in over a decade. 
4. The fourth quadrant is the Creative Economy, our
term that parallels the concept of the Creative Class 
(Florida, 2002). Florida claims that in cities and regions of 
the U.S. that are dominated by design companies, 
researchers, the arts, higher education, media firms and 
other creative communities, earnings are around 35 
percent higher than the average. The corollary of this is 
that the only way a company can escape the commodity 
trap of eroding margins, the China Price and the 
outsourcing crisis creator is to be part of the Creative 
Economy: design, invention, innovation and skilled 
customer relationships and experience-building. That is 
how high labor cost burden areas can maintain their 
standard of pay and living. The alternative is to narrow 
down the business model and focus on creating roles as 
specialized services as part of a value complex. Maga 
Steyr is part of BMW’s value complex or value web, for 
instance. (We prefer the term complex because such 
supply chains as, say, that of Dell involve multiple 
procurement, production, distribution and service webs.) 
The Creative Economy is closely tied to the other cells, 
especially specialized services. Apple, for example, is a 
design company not a consumer electronics manufacturer 
that co-sources and outsources many functions. HP takes 
this to an extreme with its printers, by far the most 
profitable of all its products. HP neither makes nor repairs 
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its printers. Contract manufacturers make them and UPS 
picks them up and services them in UPS warehouses. 
The GCS framework is evocative in its implications for 
business model versus strategy. If our analysis is correct, 
many firms will soon find that their existing model is not 
sustainable in the longer-term. Many are stuck in Cell 3 – 
the outsourcing crisis creator – and, as suppliers, 
vulnerable to the specialist services innovators. They are 
vulnerable as producers to commoditization. They are in a 
value-eroding not value-generating position. The question 
that the framework raises is what role does a particular 
company most effectively play in the global sourcing 
economy? Many of the most effective business models of 
the past two decades have been ones where a company 
builds a distinctive role in an expanding 
company/customer/business partner complex, often by 
surrounding a commodity transaction with value-adding 
services. UPS is one example of surrounding the basic 
package delivery with third party logistical services that 
include repairs, financing, international customs and 
payments, and many others. Consumer electronic and cell 
phone manufacturers are extending their value web roles 
by allowing 60% of their products to be made by third 
parties. 
Regardless of the specific applicability of the GCS 
framework, it highlights the major difference between 
viewing sourcing as a tactical matter, a strategic option or 
the basis for a new business model. The choice of 
perspective is a choice of transformation target and 
opportunity: tactically transform selected operations costs, 
strategically improve overall company efficiency, or 
redefine identity, roles and value complex/web.  
This choice of transformation response has profound 
implications for the structure of organizations. Modern 
businesses are increasingly sourcing processes to and from 
other organizations, often located in different parts of the 
world. The concept of the value web has come to denote a 
demand-driven organization that re-configures its business 
partner relationships to adapt to changes in customer 
demand and/or economic conditions. This nonlinear form 
of organization needs to be able to coordinate increasingly 
dispersed processes, while continuing to create value.  
9. Summary and Conclusions
While it remains very fragmented, the work on
business models provides the basis for practical 
recommendations for business model design. We distil the 
key insights from the analysis of this paper into the 
following recommendations for business model design: 
1. An effective business model is rigorous in its value
logic. The role of the many forecasts, figures and 
spreadsheets that typically feed into business model 
planning is to provide grounding for the hypothesis of 
value. 
2. Business models are a narrative. They must be
simple in their statement and help to mobilize relevant 
stakeholders. These may include investors, customers, 
suppliers, and other partners. 
3. The Patent Office criteria are relevant to testing the
worth of the business model: usefulness, novelty and non-
obviousness. A “model” that fails these tests is part of 
business strategy and should be addressed as such. 
4. Business models should separate model from
strategy but ensure the links to strategy. If that separation 
cannot be made, then again this is the domain of 
traditional strategic planning.  
5. The most effective business models will be industry-
independent, though their initial embodiment in strategy 
may be industry-specific. The most powerful business 
models will be those that provide an immediate target of 
opportunity but that permit the longer-term opening up of 
larger and broader market spaces in which to create value 
complexes. 
This paper has examined the concepts underlying 
business models and how they transform organizations. It 
has provided guidance as to how to construct viable 
business models. It proposes that transformation of 
organizational structures are the missing link through 
which business models may make a real contribution. By 
addressing this missing link, this paper provides an 
overview of applications of business models to 
organizations. It highlights changes to organizations and 
competitive ecologies that have ensued as a result of these 
business models.  
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